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ABSTRACT (max 150 words)  
  
Technocracy is one of the main issues in contemporary social sciences scholarship. While many au-
thors have written on, among others themes, the rise of technocracy, the concept and definition of 
technocracy, or the typologies of technocratic governments, the specific question of the relation between 
technocracy (and technocrats) and state transformations has been less explored. Through the study 
of the Italian case, we analyze the role of technocrats in three critical junctures (since the early 
1980s to the present), and in light of the intertwined process of state transformation and neoliberal-
ization. The paper thus provides for a long-term analysis of technocracy and the state, asking when, 
how, and in what conditions technocrats not only came to hold top-government positions, but also 
concurred to redefine intra-state institutional relations especially as regards the strengthening of ex-
ecutive power.  
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The scientific literature concerned with the nature and the role of technoc-
racy and technocrats is wide-ranging and has shed light on important – theoretical 
and empirical – aspects of this phenomenon. Academic works have analysed the 
consolidation of technocracy and expertise in contemporary society (Fischer 1990, 
2009; Habermas 2015; Antonelli 2019), technocratic governments and the drivers of 
their formation (McDonnell & Valbruzzi 2014; Pastorella 2016; Wratil & Pastorella 
2018), or the rule of technocrats in the European Union (Wallace & Smith 1995; 
Radaelli 1999; Scicluna & Auer 2019), this latter conceivable as the starkest case of a 
technocratic order (Giannone 2015). More recently, also hybrid forms of technocra-
cy and populism, i.e. ‘technopopulism’, have been explored (Bickerton & Accetti 
2021). Other works have called for a special attention to cases of ‘technocrats in the 
state’, shedding light on their role in specific critical junctures such as, in relation to 
the Italian case, the negotiations of the European Monetary Union during the early 
1990s (Dyson & Featherstone 1996; see also Fabbrini & Donà 2003).  
The aim of this study is reflecting upon the agency of technocrats in the 
state by (i) exploring the relation between technocracy and the transformations of 
the Italian state, while also (ii) paying particular attention to processes of neoliberal 
economic reform. In strict relation to these points, this work also aims to outline a 
more dynamic conceptualisation of technocrats as groups of individuals – a ‘collec-
tive intellectual’ (Cozzolino 2021) – that express ideas, interests and values (Lastrico 
2015), and translate them into policy and political relations more broadly.    
The analysis is carried on in a long-term perspective and zooms in on what 
we call ‘technocracy-in-action’ in three fundamental critical junctures of Italian history: 
(i) the early 1980s; (ii) the early 1990s; (iii) and 2011–121. These critical junctures are 
characterized by a deep economic and political crisis. Importantly, while in general 
terms ‘phases of emergency strengthen monocratic figures’ and can even change 
‘the form of State’ (Musella 2021, 12 ss.), on the other hand they can also open a 
 
1 Also meaningful, albeit falling out of the analytical spectrum, is the recent establishment of a new 
technocratic government in Italy (the Draghi government, February 2021) in the wake of the Covid-
19 pandemic. This testifies of the relevance of the ‘technocratic alternative’ in phases of emergency. 
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window of opportunity to modify the status quo and legitimate the establishment of 
technocratic governments by way of derogation from ordinary political party rela-
tions.  
Compared to the existing literature, this study stands out for several ele-
ments. In the first place, we begin with a conceptualization of the state as a terrain of 
political agency and conflict; a terrain in which technocrats became one of the driv-
ing forces behind long-term processes of state transformations. In relation to this 
aim, another element of our study is the adoption of a long-term perspective. 
Through an in-depth analysis of specific critical junctures, the paper offers a dia-
chronic study of technocratic agency, and shows how – and under what conditions 
– technocrats concurred to modify the balance of power within state institutions 
and legitimate processes of neoliberal economic reform.  
In specific relation to state institutions, the paper also emphasises the role of 
technocrats in the strengthening of executive power in Italy. The Italian case has been 
aptly defined as a unique situation of transition from democracy to democracy (Mu-
sella 2019), namely from a political system dominated by the Parliament to one 
dominated by the executive, in which the Parliament came to retain a marginal poli-
cy-making role (Cozzolino 2021). In the light of this process, we argue that techno-
cratic governments, especially in the first half of the 1990s, played a key role in 
transforming the state by fostering a process of presidentialization (Musella 2021).  
The last element worth noting concerns the question of constitutional change. 
While the Italian Constitution recognises the centrality of the Parliament and its leg-
islative and policy-making role (an institutional configuration actually ruling until the 
early 1990s), the gradual shift of decision-making power from the Parliament to the 
executive (i) altered the balance of power between state institutions as stipulated in 
the Constitution, (ii) and occurred without formal constitutional reforms (Calise 
2005; Musella 2021). Crucially, if this element generally signals that such reconfigu-
ration happened mainly via practical intra-institutional relations, this paper aims to 
shed light on the role of technocracy in this dynamic. 
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The article is organized as follows. The following section deals with the 
conceptualisation of the state and of state transformations. Subsequently, we offer a 
brief analytical framework of technocracy and technocratic governments. The sec-
tion number four analyses ‘technocracy-in-action’: we focus on the three historical 
windows in which technocrats concurred to redefine intra-state relations and policy: 
(i) the early 1980s; (ii) the early 1990s; (iii) 2011–12. In section number five we pro-
vide for a broader reflection about the overall conditions that led technocrats to 
have such a relevant position within the neoliberal hegemony in Italy. The conclu-
sions, eventually, discuss some limitations of this study and put forth a possible new 
research agenda revolving around a more dynamic understanding of technocratic 
agency.   
 
2. Opening up the state, framing state transformations 
A theoretical reflection about ‘technocracy-in-action’, and the contribution 
of technocrats to processes of institutional change, necessarily needs to begin with a 
more compelling understanding of the state and of state transformations. A dynam-
ic conceptualisation of the state allows both ‘to grapple with the decisive problem 
of internal contradictions within the State’ (Poulantzas 1978, 131) and understanding 
technocracy as a special force in the state.  
Theorising the state implies, analytically, to try to uncover the different 
layers and phenomena encompassed by the very concept of state (Barrow 1993, 10), 
and to identify the sources of state transformation. This step is particularly relevant 
for several reasons. The first of these is to avoid the trap of reification, namely look-
ing at the state as a static ‘thing’, something that possesses its own ‘will’ (for a cri-
tique of such assumptions see Mitchell 1991). In other words, it is regarded as an 
autonomous and homogenous unit in society, capable to trigger coherent processes 
of change from above, while being also deprived of internal contradictions and con-
flicts – in their turn reflecting broader contradictions and conflicts occurring in so-
ciety as a whole (for a discussion see Cozzolino 2021, chapter 2).  
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This kind of assumption bears a twofold analytical problem: on the one 
hand, it neglects the societal sources of state power; on the other, it renders increas-
ingly difficult to understand the state as a dynamic terrain of political agency. In 
what follows, given our attention to technocracy as a force of change in the state, 
we concentrate especially on this second problematique.  
A fundamental analytical step to understand the state and state transfor-
mations is to open up the ‘state box’ and conceptualize it as a terrain of political 
struggles and interactions among competing groups, with their own hegemonic pro-
jects and programmes. On the other hand, the state is a dynamic field that changes 
over time: not only in light of broader processes of change that occur in society 
(globalization, mediatization of politics, introduction of new technologies and so 
on) and that are refracted in and through state powers, but also thanks to political 
agency in the state. In other words, organized groups operating within state institu-
tions may favour the redefinition of intra-state institutional relations and state re-
forms that can alter formal constitutional powers and relations – even without legal 
changes to the constitution. The strengthening of executive powers and so-called 
independent agencies (Cozzolino 2019) vis-à-vis representative institutions like the 
Parliament is a case in point (Musella 2019, 2021). And yet, a still open question is 
understanding what role technocrats played in this process.      
As we argue below, technocracy does matter in processes of state trans-
formations and policy change. But, before entering into a detailed analysis of such 
dynamics, here we put forth a conceptualisation of technocracy as a highly peculiar 
force in the state, usually operating within institutions such as central Banks (as the 
Bank of Italy, in our case), ministries of economy and finance, and independent 
agencies. This force, by drawing strength and legitimation by expertise and “tech-
nical” knowledge, can be able to influence the policy process and, to a relevant ex-
tent, inter-institutional relations. In specific relation to the Italian case, we show that 
– especially since the 1980s – technocrats were key both to the neoliberal restructur-
ing of the country and to state transformations. In the next section, we introduce 
the concept of technocracy and put forth a more dynamic conception of techno-
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cratic groups as force of change in the state, also paying attention to the relation be-
tween technocracy and neoliberalism.  
 
3. Technocracy and technocratic governments in the neoliberal age 
In general terms, technocracy is ‘the exercise of power based on expertise’ 
(Meynaud 1965, 28), namely specialized skills and knowledge that allow experts and 
technocrats to advocate efficient and ‘right’ solutions to resolve societal problems. 
As Sarfatti Larson (1972-73, 5) pointed out, ‘the experts’ role becomes technocratic 
only when it is inserted at high levels of responsibility in a public or private appa-
ratus of power’. In this line of reasoning, Meynaud noted that ‘when he [sic] be-
comes a technocrat, the expert becomes political’ (1964, 262, quoted in McDonnell 
& Valbruzzi 2014, 657). These last points are useful to differentiate between ‘tech-
nicians, those who through training and expertise are given the management of a 
part of the administrative apparatus, under the direction of other elites, and technocrats, 
who do enjoy autonomy within their areas of expertise and may influence non-
technical decisions’ (Centeno 1993, 310). In an ideal typical definition, technocrats 
are a ‘state elite […] that seek[s] to impose a single, exclusive policy paradigm based 
on the application of instrumentally rational techniques’ (Id., 314). 
The latter point highlights the existence of an implicit tension between 
democracy and technocracy, which emerges especially in times of crisis of democra-
cy (Antonelli 2019). Various authors investigated the reasons for the crisis of liberal 
democracy, dating back it at least to the 1970s (Crozier et al. 1975). For instance, 
according to Norris and Inglehart (2019), the silent revolution in values brought 
about by the advent of post-industrial society and the rise of neoliberalism triggered 
a backlash which fueled support for authoritarian-populist parties, thus endangering 
liberal democracy. On the other hand, the belief in people’s aspirations for a strong 
democracy has been also greatly diminished: some studies have indeed shown that 
the main objective of citizens is a non-conflictual democracy (Hibbing and Theiss-
Morse 2002). In this respect, the intrinsic strength of technocracy, and the source of 
its legitimation, lies in its (apparent) objective, technical and neutral knowledge, 
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which may lead to a non-conflictual decision-making, alternative to the authoritari-
an-populist one. And yet, more realistically, ‘professionals have all too often served 
the ideological function of legitimating decisions made elsewhere by political rather 
than scientific means’ (Fischer 2009, 4). 
Before exploring the specific kind of hegemony exerted by technocrats, it 
is preliminary worth offering a conceptual clarification of the question of techno-
cratic governments, relevant especially in relation to Italy. As a matter of fact, with 
four technocratic governments since the early 1990s to the present coronavirus cri-
sis, the Italian case is one of the starkest examples of technocratic agency in the 
state.  
Albeit generally representing only a small component of post-World War 
II overall governments in Europe, technocratic governments constitute a highly rel-
evant case of experts in core executive positions. Following the definition and clas-
sification of McDonnell and Valbruzzi (2014, 656), a technocratic government is 
such when (I) major governmental decisions are not made by elected party officials; 
(II) policy is not decided within parties which then act cohesively to enact it; (III) 
the highest officials (ministers, prime ministers) are not recruited through party. At 
the same time, technocratic governments can be distinguished between full techno-
cratic governments when these are composed only by technocratic (i.e. non-party) 
figures, and technocratic-led governments when (1) the prime minister is a technocrat2; 
(2) the majority of ministers are technocrats; (3) they have a mandate to change the 
status quo (McDonnell & Valbruzzi 2014, 662–64). 
Another important question is also to understand the conditions that fa-
vour the formation of technocratic (or technocratic-led) governments. Adopting a 
comparative perspective, Wratil and Pastorella (2018) found that the formation of 
such governments mainly occurs in moments of crisis, which can be mainly linked 
either to political scandals, which erode the legitimation of existing parties, or to 
economic recessions, when harsh economic policies are enacted to (supposedly) re-
 
2 In turn, a Prime Minister is a technocrat when he/she has never held public office under the ban-
ner of a political party; is not a formal member of any party; is publicly recognised to possess non-
party political expertise which is directly relevant to the role occupied in government (2014, 657–58). 
Interdisciplinary Political Studies, 7(1) 2021: 5-34, DOI: 10.1285/ i20398573v7n1p5 
12 
 
cover the economy. Finally, in the formation of technocratic executives, political 
parties seem to retain a central role in: agreeing to form a technocratic government 
may be interpreted as a ‘‘survival strategy’ used by potential formateur parties to 
shirk electoral responsibility and re-establish their credibility and that of their poli-
cies’ (Wratil & Pastorella 2018, 451).  
Taxonomies usefully provide for additional conceptual rigour to under-
stand technocracy, yet they also bear the risk to limit the relevance of technocracy 
as a form of autonomous political agency and ideology in contemporary democra-
cies. While a full-blown theoretical discussion of technocracy falls out of the scope 
of this study (on this see Lastrico 2015), here it is important to remark the type of 
hegemony exerted by technocrats, and its relation to processes of neoliberalization. 
With Meynaud (1965), we contend that technocracy is not a form of negation of 
politics: neutral and ‘objective’ solutions to societal issues cannot exist without con-
nection to partisan values, ideas, and interests. Thus, technocracy is, first of all, a 
form of depoliticised political discourse based on the ‘competence’ and ‘skills’ of 
experts, which veils the partisan nature of policy choices. On the other hand, we al-
so maintain that technocrats are groups of individuals that not only express ideas 
and worldviews and even political projects, but also that, from within state institu-
tions, exercise a degree of political agency. It is here that our analysis intervenes: by 
exploring three critical junctures, we argue that technocrats (and technocratic gov-
ernments) are not only a card put on the table by presidents or parties during a 
scandal or a recession, but a ‘collective intellectual’ (in the state) expressing forms of 
political and policy agency. 
Crucially, the political strategy (and legitimation) rooted into technocratic 
logic is variously tied, theoretically, to neoliberalism, and, historically, to processes 
of neoliberalization and state transformations. 
Concerning the first point, as Will Davies pointed out (2014, 18), neoliber-
alism can be conceived as ‘an attempt to replace political judgement with economic 
evaluation’. This involves the replacement of the pursuit of ‘justice’ with ‘the calcu-
lated maximization of efficiency […] as the test of legitimate action’ (Id., 148). Effi-
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ciency is best implemented through depoliticized forms of public policy and de-
democratized forms of decision-making (Burnham 1999; Moini 2015). In this view, 
technocracy represents one of the three possible modes of depoliticized neoliberal 
governance,3 through which an attempt is made to limit the room for manoeuvre of 
democratic politics in favour of a technocratic management which is (more) able to 
present ‘the normativity of economic evaluation […] as a quasi-constitutional tem-
plate for the state’ (Davies 2014, 148).  
Concerning the second point, rather being ‘value-neutral’, technocrats’ pol-
icy choices are straightforwardly neoliberal-oriented, directed to strengthen the 
scope of markets in several domains (monetary and fiscal policy, labour market and 
wages) while reducing public expenditures (e.g. McDonnell & Valbruzzi 2014, 663). 
In more institutional terms, we show that technocrats in the state promoted pro-
cesses of centralization and insulation of decision-making, mostly by strengthening 
the core executive (Cozzolino 2021, chapter 4). Therefore, neoliberalization and ex-
ecutivization are two intertwined processes, and both put in serious question the 
shape of representative democracy. But also, importantly, technocrats provided for 
additional legitimation to unpopular reforms especially during phases of economic 
crisis and emergency. For all these reasons, we see technocrats not only as an option 
in difficult times, but as a group that, in specific conditions, dynamically and in var-





3 Depoliticization can be conceived as a highly political governing strategy, which aims to camouflage 
the political nature of decision-making, through three different (but not alternative) forms: A) the 
governance by expertise, consisting of the reassignment of government tasks to ‘non-political’ bod-
ies, such as the European Central Bank, or the placement of technocrats in government; B) the gov-
ernance by numbers, that is the adoption of measures ostensibly to increase the accountability, 
transparency and external validation of public policies (Supiot 2011; Desrosieres 2015; Rottenburg et 
al. 2015); C) the governance by law, based on the acceptance of external binding ‘rules’ which limit 
government room for manoeuvre (Burnham 1999; for a detailed discussion see Giannone 2019, 
chapter 2). 
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4. Technocracy-in-action: the role of technocrats in critical historical junc-
tures   
Several elements make the Italian political and institutional system a privi-
leged perspective to understand technocracy in more dynamic terms. First of all, 
technocrats have played a fundamental role in domestic policy-making since the col-
lapse of Fascism and the establishment of the Republic, as the key figure of Luigi 
Einaudi (governor of the post-war Bank of Italy and later on President of the Re-
public) testifies (Masini 2019). Importantly, technocrats provided discursive re-
sources that, in various critical moments of recent history, legitimated processes of 
change, often supplying to the party system and even to liberal political culture 
(Amyot 2004). The most interesting factor is the transition of leading technocratic 
figures through different roles in state’s apparatuses, from technocratic ones (mostly 
the Bank of Italy) to the government.  
In what follows, through a narrative analysis we explore three critical junc-
tures that brought to the fore the role of technocrats in the state, thus retracing the 
key stages of such process since the 1980s. Following Capoccia and Keleman, we 
conceive critical junctures as ‘relatively short periods of time during which there is a 
substantially heightened probability that agents’ choices will affect the outcome of 
interest’ (2007, 348)4. Such periods open ‘macro-windows of opportunity’ (Keeler 
1993) for powerful political actors to change the status quo, and trigger new path-
dependent processes and new institutional equilibria. In the case of this study, while 
we conceive the early 1990s as the critical juncture that favoured both the reconfigu-
ration of the state and a massive neoliberal policy programme (Giannone & Cozzo-
lino 2021), we re-trace the role of technocrats in the early 1980s to show the histori-
cal consolidation and role of this force in the state. Thus, we zoom in on three main 
critical junctures: 
 
4 More specifically, ‘critical junctures are characterized by a situation in which the structural (that is, 
economic, cultural, ideological, organizational) influences on political action are significantly relaxed 
for a relatively short period, with two main consequences: the range of plausible choices open to 
powerful political actors expands substantially and the consequences of their decisions for the out-
come of interest are potentially much more momentous’ (Capoccia & Keleman 2007, 343). 
Adriano Cozzolino & Diego Giannone, Technocrats in (the crises of) the state. Political change and state 




1. The late 1970s and early 1980s, which were marked by high inflation 
rates and, above all, a heightened cycle of political and social conflicts (Aldo Moro, 
the President of Christian Democracy, was kidnapped and killed by the Red Bri-
gades in 1978). Technocrats entered into the political conflict through changing the 
monetary policy of Italy. 
2. The early 1990s, with the crisis of the Lira and the democratic and eco-
nomic crisis of the First Republic5, is the main critical juncture and is marked by 
both a political scandal and an economic crisis.  
3. The years 2011-12, with the crisis of the sovereign debt – following the 
global financial crisis of 2008 – and the harsh neoliberal and austerity policy intro-
duced thereafter, even through a modification of the constitution.      
The next section is divided in three parts, each dedicated to a crisis in the 
state.  
 
4.1. Manoeuvring in the state: technocrats in Italy in the 1980s  
The 1980s can be conceived as a critical decade for the intertwined dynam-
ic of state transformation and early processes of neoliberalization. In this phase sev-
eral policy-makers, state representatives, and technocrats laid the foundations for 
the major changes occurred in the early 1990s, when technocrats achieved top-
government positions and led the process of neoliberal restructuring. This moment 
is therefore fundamental to comprehend the epistemic, institutional and policy rup-
ture that consolidated in the following decades. Here we argue that technocrats in 
the state exerted an autonomous political initiative aimed at depoliticising monetary 
policy by fostering the independence of the Bank of Italy (BoI). 
Therefore, to understand this key historical moment is necessary to look at 
some critical policy choices of two institutions: the Bank of Italy and, to a lesser ex-
tent, the Treasury.6 In the early 1980s, both of these promoted a fundamental re-
 
5 This is linked to the investigation ‘Mani Pulite’ (Clean Hands) and the slaughters of the Mafia.  
6 Let us note that while the state is globally a terrain of political agency, such terrain is uneven. This is 
to say that some branches in the state are directly exposed to popular-societal pressures, interests and 
conflicts, while others are more secluded from direct influence. If the Parliament and, to a lesser ex-
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form of the monetary policy of the country, coupled with a process of centralization 
of policy-making concerning state budget and fiscal policy. But before shedding 
light on such changes, it is worth reflecting first of all on the Italian ‘technocratic 
collective intellectual’, especially in relation to the BoI.  
Historically the BoI owned a ‘near monopoly of specialized economic 
knowledge’ for ‘it has been by far the most important think tank and research cen-
tre in the economic field in Italy’ (Quaglia 2005, 549). Such specialized knowledge 
was clearly influenced by neoclassical economics and monetarism, on the rise since 
the late 1970s and everywhere tied to central banks7 and neoliberal counterrevolu-
tion. On the other hand, several elements put the BoI at the forefront of neoliberal 
reform: the quasi monopoly of expertise, the reputation of the Bank, and crucially, 
the fact that ‘foreign authorities and international organizations often regarded this 
institution as their best or only resource in Italy for economic data and analysis of 
economic policy’ (ibid., 550). This last factor – the international dimension – is par-
ticularly relevant. Top-officials in the BoI were all trained (especially at PhD level) 
in leading international universities of the U.S. and UK, therefore ‘importing’ in Ita-
ly the latest advances in neoclassical/neoliberal political economy, showing also the 
transnational nature of neoliberalism on the other (ibid.).  
In policy terms, the BoI, alongside with the Treasury, enacted – in 1981 – 
one of the most important reforms of monetary policy ever occurred in Italy. Such 
reform, the so-called ‘divorce’, was neither debated in the Parliament nor passed by 
a law. It happened overnight through a mere exchange of letters between the head 
of the BoI of the time, Carlo Azeglio Ciampi (later on Prime Minister in the first 
technocratic government of Italy), and the Minister of Treasury Beniamino Andre-
atta. In short, before 1981 the Bank purchased all the Treasury bonds that were not 
subscribed by private investors (through monetary base creation), while after that 
reform the BoI became de facto independent from the Treasury, and accordingly 
 
tent, the government are examples of institutions more exposed to grassroots pressures, central 
banks are the paradigm of institutions way more insulated from democratic political forces – even in 
cases as the Italian, when the Bank was constitutionally bound to Treasury decisions. 
7 The case of the U.S. Federal Reserve under the direction of Paul Volcker is a case in point (see 
Harvey 2005, 23).  
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from political authorities. After the ‘neo-liberal divorce’ – according to Gualmini 
and Schmidt (2014, 352) – the BoI ‘ceased to be the buyer of last resort of unsold 
government bonds and direct controls on credit and administrative obligations were 
dismantled in favour of a more market-oriented regulation’.  
The new autonomy of the Bank produced enormous change in the mone-
tary constitution of Italy (Graziani 1998; Cozzolino 2021, chapter 4). Generally, it 
favoured a non-accommodating policy towards wage-earners through curbing infla-
tion regardless to unemployment level and recessive turns; set the stage for the fis-
cal policy of permanent balanced budget (permanent austerity), thereafter the imper-
ative of Italian macroeconomic policy especially from the 1990s (Cozzolino 2020); 
finally, it allowed for the systematic resort to global financial credit markets to fi-
nance government expenditures. This last element, linked to the rise of real interest 
rates in the 1980s, produced a general increase in the level of government debt, 
while also improved the overall influence of international creditors on Italy’s macro-
economic policy. 
This reform was the pivot of several other important changes occurring in 
the state, which ‘prepared’ the imposition of neoliberal policy and permanent fiscal 
retrenchment. Here it is important to stress especially the centralization of budget 
procedures, which slipped away from the Parliament to fall into the aegis of the ex-
ecutive-Treasury complex (Ferrera & Gualmini 2004, 61). Through the new auton-
omy of the BoI, the growing centralization of fiscal policy and budget, and the mar-
ginalization of Parliament’s policy-making role, the 1980s saw a series of fundamen-
tal while incremental movements of state transformations, setting the stage for the 
early 1990s broader transition.   
 
4.2. Technocrats in government and neoliberal reforms in the 1990s 
If the 1980s were a phase of incremental changes, the role of technocrats 
was indeed crucial in the early 1900s, which can be conceived as the critical juncture 
for realization of the premises laid down in the previous decade.  
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The overall context of deep emergency characterising Italy in the early 
1990s opened a macro-window of opportunity for technocrats to achieve top-
government positions. The crisis was twofold: a political scandal and an economic 
recession. In greater detail, in 1992 Italy was hit by an intertwined set of interna-
tional and domestic crises, this also in the background of the key negotiations of the 
European Monetary Union (EMU) since 1990, which further empowered techno-
crats in the state (Dyson & Featherstone 1996).  
Starting with the international dimension, since the 1980s the Italian econ-
omy was increasingly dependent on foreign creditors, and public debt started to ris-
ing especially due to growing interest rates (Graziani 1998). In this situation, a spec-
ulative financial attack pushed Italy to abandon the European Monetary System in 
1992, causing at the same time a further rise in the public debt (skyrocketing to 121 
percent on GDP in 1994, it was 56 percent in 1980) and the devaluation of the Lira. 
Such context of enduring emergency pushed political authorities to assure interna-
tional creditors about the credibility of the Italian economic programme, especially 
via technocratic governments and the commitment to fiscal austerity and neoliberal-
izing measures.  
In specific relation to domestic politics, the early 1990s witnessed to an ab-
rupt and unique breakdown in the national political system. The triggering element 
of the political crisis was the scandal known as Tangentopoli (‘Bribesville’), a network 
of corruption practices involving two of the main parties of the time, the Christian 
Democracy and the Italian Socialist Party, which were substantially downsized 
thereafter. Alongside the demise of the Italian Communist Party (the other larger 
party of that period) after the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989) and of the Soviet Union 
(1991), in the space of a few months the party system changed radically, with the 
old Republican parties wiped out and new parties entering the scene, especially Ber-
lusconi’s Forza Italia, the Northern League, and the post-Communist Democratic 
Party of the Left. Also, the structure of the political system changed, with the transi-
tion from a proportional electoral system to a mostly majoritarian one, thus favour-
ing the formation of grand coalitions in the name of (since then never reached) po-
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litical stability. Importantly, all these changes marked the transition from the First to 
the Second Italian Republic.  
In the political vacuum left by Tangentopoli, and in the background of both 
the international financial emergency and the advanced phase of European integra-
tion (with the negotiations and then the signature of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992), 
technocrats found a window of opportunity, within the government, to introduce 
fundamental neoliberal reforms in a very short amount of time. In 1992, Giuliano 
Amato (a former Law professor) led an ad interim government that soon after was 
substituted, in 1993, by a technocratic government led by the former governor of 
the Bank of Italy, Carlo Azeglio Ciampi. After a short-lived centre-right executive 
led by Silvio Berlusconi, the second technocratic government of this period was es-
tablished in 1995, and was led by another former top-member of the BoI, Lamberto 
Dini. Here we aim to stress in particular two elements: the first is the resort by these 
governments to decree laws and extraordinary legal measures, the second concerns 
their policy choices.  
In relation to the question of decree laws, this is a crucial element to un-
derstand the progressive empowerment of executive powers (a key factor in the 
transformation of the state), and how early-1990s governments were fundamental 
actors in such process. As showed elsewhere (Cozzolino 2019, 2021), the decrees 
enacted by the executive skyrocketed between 1992 and 1996, altering the balance 
of power between state institutions especially at the expenses of parliamentary au-
tonomous policy role. The number of decrees enacted in this period is unparalleled 
in the entire history of the Republic (for a general overview see Cozzolino, 2021 
chapter 6). Crucially, while the Italian Constitution clearly stipulates that decree laws 
(also labelled ‘emergency legislation’) must be enacted only in extraordinary cases of 
necessity and urgency (art. 77), from these years onwards such emergency legal tools 
started to be used systematically, thus circumventing the Constitution and becoming 
de facto ordinary instruments to implement policy. Ordinary law, namely the law 
originating in the Parliament, begun to decline thereafter and today accounts only 
for a marginal source of policy-making.  
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The transformation of the state through the empowerment of the execu-
tive – vis-à-vis an ever-increasing marginal role of the Parliament – is the counter-
part of the processes of neoliberalization. In short, in the space of a few years tech-
nocratic governments enacted – through decree – a series of neoliberalizing 
measures concerning privatization, pension system, labour market, industrial rela-
tions, and budget consolidation (McDonnell & Valbruzzi 2014; Cozzolino 2021, 
72–73; Fazi 2021). For instance, in 1993 the Ciampi government passed a key re-
form in labour market concerning the modification of the collective bargaining sys-
tem in order to pursue income and anti-inflationary policy.  Also important is the 
reform of the electoral system, which changed from a proportional to a mainly ma-
joritarian one to favour the introduction of a bi-polar political regime (legitimated 
by its improved stability, despite the reduction in the spectrum of political represen-
tation). But the 1990s were also a moment of intense austerity therapy: cuts in state 
budget were the leitmotif of this period, when governments of all political orienta-
tions passed several fiscal adjustment measures aimed to achieve surplus in state 
budget while also decreasing public debt and interest rates. The same discourse ap-
plies to Dini government, which continued on the pathway of economic restructur-
ing especially in relations to pension and wage deflation, along with the policy of 
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Table 1 - Technocratic governments and economic policy  
Governments Economic Policy 
Ciampi government (1993–1994) Reform of the collective bargaining sys-
tem; public administration reforms; 
wage controls; adoption of a legal 
framework for supplementary pensions; 
electoral system reform 
 
Dini government (1995–1996) Introduction of a flexible retirement 
age; shift to a contribution-related for-
mula for pensions; indexation of pen-
sions to real wage growth; deficit cuts 
 
Source: McDonnell and Valbruzzi (2014, 663).  
 
The 1990s can be conceived as the phase of consolidation of neoliberal 
and austerity therapy and discourse, within a process of deep reconfiguration of the 
state. Such schema, as we argue in next paragraph, is reproduced also in the back-
ground of another financial crisis, that of 2011.  
 
4.3. Back to the future: state of emergency and technocrats in 2011  
The resort to technocratic governments was not just limited to the early 
1990s. Actually, the critical juncture of the early 1990s, thanks to the agency of 
technocrats in the state, triggered a path-dependent process characterised by (i) the 
centralization of decision-making power, (ii) permanent austerity and neoliberaliza-
tion (Cozzolino 2020). Above all, it created a historical precedent whereby the op-
tion of a technocratic government, under specific conditions, is always a possibility 
– as also testified by the actual technocratic government led by Mario Draghi 
(2021). The case of the formation of the technocratic government led by Mario 
Monti (2011–13) deserves particular attention for the conditions in which it oc-
curred, and the consequences in institutional and policy terms.  
The Great Crisis of 2008 hit hard Western economies, leaving long-lasting 
scars especially to those countries characterised by high public debt and slow 
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growth rates. Actually, among the consequences of the global financial crisis, the 
growth of public debts and budget deficits (mostly due to automatic stabilizers and 
discretional financial intervention aimed to sustain the economic activity) were the 
most visible effects alongside economic recession. This situation soon led, only two 
years after (2010), to the crisis of sovereign debts. Portugal, Ireland, Spain, Greece 
and Italy were all hit by a crisis of international trust by credit markets about the 
sustainability of their public debts, in the background of the rapid worsening of 
their economic performance. Italy was at the forefront of this situation being one of 
the largest economies in the Eurozone and given the entity of its public debt. The 
immediate effect of this crisis was the growth of interest rates, in turn leading (as 
seen in the early 1990s) to a further rise in public debt.  
The birth of the technocratic government led by Mario Monti needs to be 
understood in this context of financial emergency and increasing pressures exerted 
by both international financial markets and European institutions (Sacchi 2015; 
Moschella 2017), coupled with a shared distrust in the right-wing government of the 
time led by Silvio Berlusconi. It is also worth mentioning that in August 2011 the 
president of the European Central Bank Jean-Claude Trichet, together with his 
anointed successor Mario Draghi, sent a secret letter to the Berlusconi government. 
The letter urged Italian government to take immediate action and implement a pro-
gramme of structural (i.e. neoliberal) reforms and austerity measures to reassure in-
ternational creditors about the ‘virtuous’ pathway of recovery undertaken by Italy8. 
Interestingly, the letter pushed Italian authorities to enact such measure by decree, 
thus explicitly suggesting circumventing parliamentary scrutiny and discussion. Sec-
ond, and even more importantly, the letter recommended reforming the constitution in 
order to make more stringent budgetary rule – an explicit commitment to perma-
nent austerity.  
 
8 The policy program envisaged by the letter comprised liberalization of public services and privati-
zations; a widespread strategy of fiscal consolidation through direct cuts in budget expenditures, 
pension reform, a new mechanism aimed at reduce automatically state expenditures when the deficit 
level exceeds the prearranged level; reform of the collective bargaining system from central to firm 
level, in order to adjust salaries and working conditions to the ‘specific necessity of enterprises’; re-
form labor law to facilitate dismissals (for a broader discussion see Giannone 2015, 112–116; Cozzo-
lino 2021, 137–38).  
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Just a few months after this letter was sent, the change in the government 
occurred. In short, a series of pressures coming from financial markets and Europe-
an institutions led the President of the Italian Republic of the time, Giorgio Napoli-
tano, to push Silvio Berlusconi to resign. Napolitano masterminded the operation of 
the change in the government through appointing Mario Monti – former Dean of 
the private university Bocconi, former EU commissioner, and prominent neoclassi-
cal economist since the 1980s – first as ‘senator for life’, and then as Prime Minister 
in November 2011, holding also the position of Minister of Economy and Finance. 
Crucially, Monti executive ‘quickly adopted the ECB letter - and the structural re-
forms it prescribed - as its roadmap’ (Sacchi 2015, 85). 
As for the technocratic governments of the 1990s, also in this case we pay 
attention both to the political-institutional dimension and policy measures. Starting 
with the first dimension, it is worth preliminary noting that the very creation of the 
Monti government amounted to an important twist of formal constitutional proce-
dures. Actually, this government was ‘born neither with the official declaration of 
the government crisis and the early end [of the legislature], nor with the calling for 
regular elections to attain the formation of new government’ (Calvano 2014, 7). 
Another important aspect of the establishment of this technocratic government was 
the unprecedented political involvement of the President of the Republic – which, 
as already noted, masterminded the entire operation leading to the formation of the 
Monti executive.  
Following the pattern established with the governments of the early 1990s, 
also the Monti executive soon resorted (and brought to the next level) to several ex-
traordinary legal measures (Criscitiello 2021). Besides the unprecedented resort to 
decree laws, Monti government activated another instrument to put under strain the 
Parliament, that is, the so-called confidence question9 (see Cozzolino 2019, 345–47 
 
9 The confidence question, introduced in 1988 (Law No. 400) to strengthen executive power vis-à-
vis the Parliament, can be brought by the cabinet to the Parliament with respect to key bills, so as to 
reduce the risk of a parliamentary rejection. In this case, the executive advises its parliamentary ma-
jority to call for new elections in case of a negative vote on the bill covered by the confidence ques-
tion. At the same time, this legal mechanism serves to fast-track the approval of the specific bill, re-
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for a more detailed overview). The effect of the joint and systematic use of decree 
laws and confidence question was a further important reduction of the role and au-
tonomy of the Parliament as regards policy-making and amending power. Yet, de-
spite the escalation in the activation of such extraordinary and exceptional powers, 
maybe the key measure passed by the Monti executive is the reform of the Consti-
tution. Voted in 2012 by a large coalition (spanning both the centre-left and right) 
of parties, this reform introduced in the Constitution the principle of the balanced 
budget and of the ‘sustainability’ of government debt (art. 81), and was legitimated 
as the domestic application of the European Fiscal Compact. This reform, in con-
trast with key principles of the Italian Constitution – which stipulates, among other 
things, the primacy of labour (art. 1), the right to work (art. 4 and 35), the right to a 
fair remuneration (art. 36), a socially oriented economy (art. 41) –, imposed, even on 
symbolic terms, the neoliberal principle of the permanent fiscal restraint. In relation 
to the specific policy measures, this government followed a pathway of harsher ne-
oliberalization processes: reform of labour market and pension, cuts in budget ex-
penditures, automatic fiscal adjustment through increases in the VAT tax, the al-
ready mentioned reform of the Constitution, and so on.  
The experience of the technocratic executive born in 2011 is significant in 
several respects: the continuities in the international political economy dimension 
(i.e., crises and tensions on credit markets); the resort to exceptional measures to 
compress the role of political forces in the Parliament and silence political dissent 
(also outside of the Parliament); the acceleration on the pathway of neoliberaliza-
tion. However, this executive was also characterised by a strong decisionist ap-
proach, a blatant distrust for unions and policy negotiations among social parties, 
and a direct monitoring and surveillance of EU institutions. The next paragraph dis-
cusses the role and consequences of technocracy in Italy from the perspective of 
state transformations.    
 
 
ducing the time allocated for discussion and thus for the amending power of parliamentary forces to 
potentially be exercised (Cozzolino 2019, 346).  
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5. Technocracy as a force in the state. Insights from the Italian case  
The article has sought to provide for an overview, by looking at three criti-
cal junctures, of the role of technocrats in fostering processes of reconfiguration of 
state powers and policies in Italy. We started our examination by remarking that the 
state is not a closed, static and homogenous unity/thing, but a stratified field of po-
litical conflicts and interactions (which in their turn occur within a broader societal 
structure crossed by many other socio-political conflicts) carried-on by different po-
litical forces in the state. Also, we argued that within the state as a terrain of political 
action, technocracy is part and parcel of political and policy processes – a factor 
which can also lead, and actually led, to the reconfiguration of intra-state institu-
tional relations. Now, it is possible to say something more as regards what we called 
‘technocracy-in-action’ and the reconfiguration of the state.  
First of all, we understand technocracy as a force in the state with its own 
purposes and autonomy of action. On the other hand, we already argued that the 
construction of market economy is possible thanks to the mobilization of state ex-
ecutive powers. This argument implies two main consequences. First, the state and 
market economy enjoy an internal relation; accordingly, neoliberalism, as the domi-
nant economic theory of the last phase of capitalism, is also a ‘state form’ as it con-
stitutes a project to construct, adjust and reconfigure a specific ‘state formation’ 
(Giannone 2019), and in which state actors (as the technocrats) are critical factors in 
the construction both of market economy and state policies (Cahill 2014). In this 
regard, for instance, we are at odds with those views of an abrupt change in the 
state between the 1980s and 1990s, whereby ‘although in the 1980s some neo-liberal 
policy ideas were indeed adopted [...] were mostly focused on using the state to re-
form the rules for business and labour [...]. It was not until the 1990s that the state 
came to be viewed as the problem, not the solution’ (Gualmini & Schmidt 2014, 
325). Actually, if we look at the state as a terrain of political action, between the two 
periods there are important continuities in the mobilization of state powers to reform 
social relations, regardless to how the state is conceived and its reform legitimated 
politically. Elsewhere, drawing on Gramsci’s lexicon, we conceptualised the 1980s 
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as a phase of war of position, slow and incremental (an accumulation of political 
awareness and force), while the 1990s as a case of war of movement, fast and capa-
ble in a few months – and in the wake of a series of intertwined emergencies and 
crises – to improve significantly the reconfiguration of the state and, through aug-
mented executive powers, introduce neoliberal reforms (Cozzolino 2021, 70).  
The other fundamental point to be raised in relation to technocracy and 
the reconfiguration of the state concerns constitutional change. Even only briefly 
for reasons of space, we showed that technocratic governments can be character-
ised, compared to ‘political governments’, for a style of steering based on a more 
intense resort to emergency legal mechanisms and, accordingly, a minor inclination 
towards policy negotiation. While, on the one hand, this can be easily explained by 
the fact that technocrats, unlike politicians, are not linked to elections and electoral 
constituencies for the sake of their own reproduction as a professional class, on the 
other hand this has important practical consequences on the overall constitutional rela-
tions between state powers. As already noted, the empowerment of executive powers 
(especially in early 1990s) concurred (alongside with other very important factors as 
the discredit of political parties) to modify the balance of power among state institu-
tions in favour of the government and at the expenses of the Parliament – the op-
posite direction of how prescribed by the Italian Constitution and the primacy as-
signed to legislative power. Thus, despite the absence of a constitutional reform that 
explicitly recognised a new – presidential – institutional asset of the Italian state, such 
‘great transformation’ can be conceived as a de facto constitutional change in which 
technocrats played a fundamental role, also for the legitimation of this change. In 
fact, in relation to this last factor it is important to stress that the overall position of 
technocracy in Italy is favoured by the delegitimization of the political class, espe-
cially from the early 1990s, when this latter came to be associated to endemic cor-
ruption and self-interest (in the background of a parallel disempowerment of politi-
cal ideologies). This factor allowed technocrats – viewed as pragmatic individuals 
capable to manage difficult situations thanks to their expertise and knowledge, and 
willing to modernise the state – to increase their legitimation vis-à-vis professional 
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politicians. In turn, to improve the legitimation of neoliberal modernization as a means 
to rescue the country from longstanding bureaucratic inertia and other problems 
linked to an inefficient political class. Therefore, especially in highly critical junc-
tures – with a strong international dimension linked to credit markets, the process 
of European integration and the role of European institutions –, the technocratic 
card was put on the table both to legitimate deeply unpopular measures and to drive 
further processes of neoliberal restructuring of the state. In this view, technocracy 
can be conceived ‘not so much [as] the attempt to provide a resolution of the eco-
nomic crisis, as the attempt to resolve the political crisis of the state by trying to dis-
engage the state politically from the economy so as to de-politicise economic policy 
formation’ (Clarke 1990, 27).   
The question of European integration also deserves a special mention. Of 
course, many scholars pointed that this process constituted a strong source of pres-
sure for Italian authorities to reform the country and improve the overall perfor-
mance of national institutions. While we agree that the EU can be conceived as an 
institutional constraint since its nature of ‘rule of rules’ (Scicluna & Auer 2019), we 
also emphasise the role of national policy-makers, and technocrats prominently 
(Dyson & Featherstone 1996), in discursively resorting to Europe to legitimate na-
tional change and reform the state. For example, elsewhere we showed that the ear-
ly 1990s juncture is fundamental to understand the characteristics of the discursive 
order that, in the following decades, legitimated neoliberal reform, austerity policy 
and state transformations (also) by systematically resorting to Europe (Cozzolino 
2020; Fazi 2021). A schema that clearly returned during the Monti executive, when 
European authorities strongly backed Monti’s reform plan (Culpepper 2014).  
 
6. Conclusions 
In February 2021, Italy witnessed to the formation of a new technocratic 
government, led by the former President of the European Central Bank, Mario 
Draghi. Also in this case, an extraordinary situation of emergency favoured the 
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technocratic option, sign of what can be conceived as a now structural component 
of Italian politics (Fazi 2021).  
In this paper we attempted to articulate several reflections concerning the 
relation between technocracy and state transformations, dovetailing this with histor-
ical insights from the Italian case. We tried to emphasise, in particular, the political 
and agential dimension of technocracy, and how this force in the state, far from be-
ing apolitical and neutral, has its own programme for change, and its own forms of 
political legitimation and discourse. A force that, from within the state, concurred in 
several occasions to redefine intra-state institutional power relations. A precondition 
the latter to impose ongoing processes of neoliberal restructuring. 
On the other hand, this article constitutes a preliminary study for an all-
encompassing research focused on technocracy in Italy. In this respect, for instance, 
more research is needed to explore the many shades of technocracy and its rele-
vance in contemporary world: possible future avenues can include the analysis of 
the international dimension of technocracy as a transnational class of experts, 
and/or the interactions between international institutions – as the International 
Monetary Fund – and national technocrats. In relation to technocrats as a commu-
nity of, in Gramscian terms, ‘organic intellectuals’, it would be of great interest for 
future research to explore further the biographies of prominent technocratic figures, 
and understand in greater detail the ‘revolving doors’ between state bureaucracies 
(like the BoI) or academia and the government, and likewise between European and 
national dimension.  
From the perspective of democratic theory, it is still necessary to under-
stand how technocracy and the rule of experts work (Caselli 2020), and how they 
have fundamentally impacted on the political structures of post-World War II na-
tional democracies, actually reducing the space for democratic-popular forces and 
preventing real alternatives to neoliberalism and austerity (as in the case of the EU 
order, see Giannone 2015). This is, for instance, an important step to understand 
the involution of mass democracies on the one hand, and the rise of populism on 
the other.  
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The relevance of technocracy in contemporary society is increasing in 
terms of political force and visibility, and studying this force in – and beyond – the 
state would further improve our understanding of contemporary politics and the 
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